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EXPLOITATION OF FREE MARKETS 






The international community has taken measures to monitor financial networks 
through anti-money laundering acts, which since 9/11 have expanded to cover terrorist 
financing. However, the strides made to date in some parts of the world have been limited 
and gaps still exist that terrorist organizations can infiltrate to thwart the international 
community’s efforts.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate and provide an overview of current 
international counter-terrorist financing efforts and focus on how terrorists exploit them. 
This project was conducted as a study of three cases looking at globalization and free 
markets. Colombia is the primary case, while Peru and Great Britain are secondary cases. 
The goal of this project was to identify and document the trends in these countries in 
terms of existing exploitable vulnerabilities. Specifically in Colombia, the study focuses 
on the FARC, ELN and AUC, and how the Colombian government and financial 
institutions have responded. In Peru, the focus of the examination is Sendero Luminoso, 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES ARISING FROM 
GLOBALIZATION AND FREE MARKETS  
A. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
The international community has taken measures to monitor financial networks 
through anti-money laundering acts, which since 9/11 have expanded to cover terrorist 
financing. The primary vehicle has been the independent, inter-governmental policy-
making body, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and its 
regional affiliates.1 However, the strides made to date in some parts of the world have 
been limited and gaps still exist that terrorist organizations can infiltrate to thwart the 
international community’s efforts. With the global interconnectivity between nations, 
increasing because of globalization, a gap or shortcoming in one nation renders all other 
nations vulnerable to terrorists and criminal activity. By identifying how terrorist 
organizations are taking advantage of systems of financial globalization and free markets 
effective policy changes can be made. Policy changes such as changes to current 
monitoring measures and entry requirements by individuals or corporations into financial 
markets and banking institutions can effectively diminish or cut off terrorist finances. The 
result would delegitimize terrorists while denying them the capability to continue to 
conduct operations.  
B. STUDY ROAD MAP  
Colombia was selected as the primary case for this study due to its long history of 
insurgency and terrorism from both left and right wing groups and its democratic and 
economic evolution over the past fifty years. The subsequent cases of Peru, and Great 
Britain (Northern Ireland) were chosen because of their differing financial roles in the 
global free market economy and their history of dealing with terrorism. Peru and Great 
Britain (Northern Ireland) were also selected due to the divergent approaches their 
                                                 
1 James Jackson, “CRS Report for Congress: The Financial Action Task Force- An Overview,” 
Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21904, Updated March 4, 2005. 
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government chose to deal with terrorism. These countries’ actions against the terrorist 
organizations may have fueled the terrorists’ determination rather than counter it.  
The four elements studied for examining how terrorist organizations take 
advantage of financial globalization and free markets to finance their activities were each 
individual country’s: 1) economy; 2) financial markets and banking system; 3) auditing 
and internal monitoring; and 4) international cooperation. The basis for the research is 
derived from public documents, articles in academic journals, and published books. 
Works from numerous academic sources in the field of terrorist financing and economic 
crime were used to outline the current practices in the international community to counter 
terrorist financing and identify existing gaps that terrorists can and do exploit.  
This chapter offers a literature review that encompasses works from scholars and 
analysts on terrorism and democracy, terrorist financing and globalization, and 
international efforts to counter terrorist financing. The studies of relationship between 
terrorism and democracy are examined to provide a backdrop of the environment in 
which the terrorist organizations emerged and now thrive.  
Chapter II focuses on Colombia. It offers a brief discussion of the government’s 
internal failures to successfully combat terrorism that became contributing factors for 
terrorist expansion in Colombia including the facilitation of terrorist funds. A historical 
perspective on the inception of terrorism in Colombia lays the foundation for examining 
the economy, financial markets, and banking systems. The historical background also 
provides the framework for how the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces-Popular 
Army (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-defense Forces 
of Colombia (AUC) are capable of penetrating the financial markets and banking systems 
to finance their activities.  
Chapter III shifts to the presentation of two additional countries: Peru and Great 
Britain (Northern Ireland), examining the same factors of financial globalization and free 
markets explored in Chapter II for Colombia. Each country’s case is analyzed 
individually. First government actions are presented as background. Then, the four key  
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areas are examined, focusing on the status of the economy, the financial markets and 
banking system, internal auditing and monitoring, and international cooperation to 
combat terrorist financing. 
Chapter IV concludes the research with a three-country analysis of the 
similarities, differences, and implications for countering terrorist financing given issues 
in regime type, financial globalization and free markets from the three countries. Finally, 
based on the evidence presented, the study offers recommendations for policy actions to 
better counter terrorist financing. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.  Terrorism and Democracy 
First, it is important to establish a common definition and the underlying elements 
of democracy before discussing it as the context for the facilitation of terrorist financing 
in Colombia, Peru, and Great Britain. Michael Freeman conceptualizes democracy as 
“the embodiment of the notions of equality, liberty, and the rule of law through the 
combination of norms, institutions, procedures, and/or outcomes.”2 Freeman’s definition 
of democracy fits best in this study and is simplistic enough to illustrate the permissive 
environment in Colombia, Peru, and Great Britain that was created for terrorists and their 
financing activities to thrive.  
Martha Crenshaw argues that there is a need to make a distinction between direct 
and facilitating causes of terrorism within democracies.  
A comprehensive explanation [of terrorism], however, must also take into 
account the environment in which terrorism occurs and address the 
question of whether broad political, social, and economic conditions make 
terrorism more likely in some contexts than in others.3 
                                                 
2 Michael Freeman, Democracy, Al-Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, forthcoming, 2007, 1-37. Michael Freeman is Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School Defense Analysis Department. 
3 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics,” 13(4) (1981): 379-391. 
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In this study, the approach is similar in terms of looking at terrorist financing in 
the context of globalization and free markets in a democratic setting. The author does not 
argue that the government of each case study has directly caused the terrorist actions in 
their respective countries. Rather the aim is to illustrate how some of governments’ 
actions have facilitated both the existence of the terrorist organizations and their 
financing activities in their countries. Crenshaw, Leonard Weinberg, Marc Sageman, and 
others point out that there are gaps in the understanding of terrorist activities and the 
political and economic environment in which they exist.4  
Weinberg presents his studies on terrorism and democracy in terms of what he 
observes to be sources of terrorism in democracies not observed in non-democratic 
governments. Like Crenshaw, Weinberg acknowledges that each setting is different and 
generalities across countries can be misleading. However, to disregard generalities given 
the high level of interdependence and connectivity among countries in the global market 
would be dangerous and counterproductive in the international setting. Specifically, 
Patrick Hardoiun and Reiner Weichhardt’s suggest, “deficiencies in democratic 
development, a weak state, a lack of civil society, and the absence of sound economic 
institutions can be fertile bases for terrorist and criminal organizations.”5 Paula 
Dobriansky points out “terrorists have also found space to operate in democratic 
states…Democracies, however, have an advantage in their ability to rise to the occasion 
and implement needed reforms with popular consent.”6 These cases will show where the 
democratic governments did rise to the occasion as well as where they did not. 
Consequently, by not effectively countering the terrorist organizations, the democracies 
facilitated the terrorists’ existence and financing capabilities. Studying general trends of 
                                                 
4 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics,” 13(4) (1981): 379-391; 
Leonard Weinberg, in The Roots of Terrorism: Democracy and Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson, 2006, 
45-56; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 
2004).  
5 Patrick Hardouin and, Reiner Weichhardt, “Terrorist fund raising through criminal activities. Journal 
of Money Laundering Control,” 9(3) (2006): 303-308, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document 
ID: 1091265341) (accessed October 1, 2007), 303. 
6 Paula J. Dobriansky, Henry A. Crumpton, and F. Gregory Gause III, “Tyranny and Terror,” Foreign 
Affairs, 85(1) (2006): 135-138, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 979177711) 
(accessed October 27, 2007). 
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how terrorists operate and finance their activities across nations, particularly 
democracies, can be enlightening for international efforts to counter terrorists. 
2. Terrorist Financing and Globalization 
Atanas Gotchev describes globalization as the phenomenon of development of 
global production and markets and their social, political, and cultural consequences. He 
further comments that globalization is widely associated with increased economic 
integration, international exchange growth, and interdependence.7 In this study, when 
discussing the dynamics of globalization as it relates to terrorists financing, the author 
infers from the wider association of globalization. To make a distinction while examining 
all three cases, in the previous section, the political aspect of globalization and terrorism 
was introduced separately.  
Vinod Saighal points out what others in the field also acknowledge, “global 
terrorism cannot be really de-linked from the other dominant global processes that are 
shaping the world of the twenty-first century.”8 Dayanath Jayasuriya also suggests the 
same findings regarding vulnerabilities of securities and futures markets in the global 
economy. Jayasuriya states, “As developed countries strengthen controls, developing 
countries that lag behind in implementing control systems will become increasingly 
vulnerable [to criminal and terrorist exploitation].”9  
In a September 2003 speech, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated, 
“Government cannot focus only on domestic policy. Good global citizenship is part of 
governing in the 21st century…The major challenges of the time include poverty, 
environmental degradation, infectious disease, regional conflicts, organized crime and 
                                                 
7 Atanas Gotchev, “The Roots of Terrorism,” Terrorism and Globalization, ed. Louise Richardson, 
2006, 103-115. 
8 Vinod Saighal, Dealing With Global Terrorism: The Way Forward (Elgin, IL: New Dawn 
Publishing, 2004), 145.  
9 Dayanath Jayasuriya, “Money laundering and terrorism financing: The role of capital market 
regulators,” Journal of Financial Crime, 10(1) (2002): 30-36, in the ABI/INFORM Global database. 
(Document ID: 154647481) (accessed June 10, 2008), 32. 
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terrorism.”10 In today’s global environment, countries alone cannot deal with terrorism 
and terrorist financing by themselves. A concerted effort is critical in denying terrorist 
their livelihood in both the short-term and long-term. When speaking about NATO’s role 
in the international fight against terrorism, Hardoiun and Weichhardt echo the same 
sentiment, “A successful international effort to confront terrorism requires a multi-
faceted strategy that draws on strengths and unique assets of many international 
organizations.”11 
Ted Gurr points out that structured inequalities within countries “are breeding 
grounds for violent political movements in general and specifically terrorism…The 
growth of inequalities across the interdependent global system has similar 
consequences.”12 Some of the unintended consequences of globalization have in many 
instances “led to pronounced income disparities between the smallest percentages of 
people in the highest income brackets and those at the lower ends of the spectrum.”13 
Looking at terrorist financing activities, interdependent global systems also facilitate 
terrorist activities. Atanas Gotchev reinforces Gurr’s findings and suggests that although 
“according to advocates of globalization, interdependence should result in a dynamic and 
constantly modernizing world of prosperous nations,” in reality what is observed is the 
realization of an “uneven development and inequitable distribution…across countries.”14 
In terms of terrorist financing and these adverse affects of globalization, Gotchev further 
suggests that the gaps created in conflict areas provide fertile ground for terrorists to 
engage in illicit activities such as the smuggling of drugs, weapons, consumer goods, and  
 
                                                 
10 Jean Chretien, “Emphasis on Good Global Citizenship,” Presidents & Prime Ministers, 12(5), 
(September 2003): 18-19 in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 524504021) (accessed 
October 27, 2007). 
11 Patrick Hardouin and Reiner Weichhardt, “Terrorist fund raising through criminal activities,” 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, 9(3) (2006): 303-308 in the ABI/INFORM Global database 
(Document ID: 1091265341) (accessed October 1, 2007). 
12 Ted Robert Gurr, The Roots of Terrorism: Economic Factors, ed. Louise Richardson, (Club de 
Madrid, 2006) 90. 
13 Vinod Saighal, Dealing With Global Terrorism: The Way Forward (Elgin, IL: New Dawn 
Publishing, 2004), 145-146. 
14 Atanas Gotchev, “Terrorism and Globalization,” The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson, 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 105. 
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other items. This last point is specifically relevant to the discussion of the Colombian, 
Peruvian, and British terrorist organizations in this study since all have been identified as 
primarily financing their activities through drugs and weapons’ smuggling.15 
3. International Efforts to Counter Terrorist Financing 
“The linkage between terrorism and crime is mainly a functional one…terrorist 
movements frequently engage in criminal activity to finance their activities relying on 
robbery; kidnapping for ransom; extortion; and trafficking in drugs, scarce commodities, 
or consumer goods.”16 Just as criminal elements have gotten more sophisticated 
operating at a transnational level, so too have terrorist organizations. Consequently, it is 
no surprise that the international legislation for dealing with terrorist financing has its 
inception in measures to counter economic crime and money laundering.  
The international organization charged with developing the recommendations for 
nations to confront the problems of economic crime and money laundering was the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF, an independent, intergovernmental 
policy-making body, was established in 1989 by the G7 Summit in Paris due to the 
growing concerns about the threat posed by money laundering to the international 
banking system.17 The FATF issued Forty Recommendations towards this purpose in 
1990. “In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the 
discovery of the wide geographic extent of the terrorist financial infrastructure that 
enabled them, governments moved quickly to create new counter-measures that could be 
                                                 
15 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003); Ted Robert Gurr, The Roots of 
Terrorism: Economic Factors, ed. Louise Richardson, (Club de Madrid, 2006). 
16 Ted Robert Gurr, The Roots of Terrorism: Economic Factors, ed. Louise Richardson, (Club de 
Madrid, 2006), 94. 
17 Andrew Parkin, “G-7 Summit 1997,” Center for the Study of Democracy, 1997, 
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol2/v2n36g7_body.html (accessed on August 25, 2008). “The G-7 was formed 
in 1975 to provide an informal forum for coordination of economic policy among leaders of prominent 
industrialized nations. Since 1975 the agenda and scope of the G-7 has steadily expanded under pressures 
of continuing economic and political crises. The G-7 directly influences international financial and trade 
institutions by virtue of its disproportionate economic power. The G-7, composed of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.”; James Jackson, “CRS Report for 
Congress: The Financial Action Task Force-An Overview,” Congressional Research Service, Order Code 
RS21904, Updated March 4, 2005. 
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specifically used to detect and dismantle such structures.”18 Post 9/11, the FATF 
refocused its efforts towards terrorist financing and issued an additional Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist financing.19 Table 1 depicts the FATF Special 
Recommendations and a brief synopsis of what each country is expected to do. However, 
it is important to note that the FATF does not have any enforcement capability; what the 
FATF can do is suspend those member countries that do not comply with the guidelines 
in a timely manner.20  
Table 1.   FATF Nine Special Recommendations21 
Recommendation & 
Short Title 
Description of the Requirement 
1: Ratification and 
implementation of UN 
instruments 
As early as 1988, the UN passed a treaty to address money laundering and later 
a treaty was passed on drug smuggling. Subsequent treaties also addressed 
counter money laundering efforts that countries agreed to ratify. Special 
Recommendation 1 calls for countries to adhere to ratification and 
implementation of all such treaties.  




Each country would have criminalize terrorist financing, and terrorist acts and 
organizations. Further, such offenses should be designated money laundering 
predicate offenses. 
3: Freezing and 
confiscating terrorist 
assets 
Each country would have to draft and pass appropriate legislation that would 
allow the freezing and confiscating terrorist assets. This would entail the sharing 




Countries are to cooperate with other nations with regard to all matters related to 
terrorism and terrorist financing. This includes criminal and civil enforcement, 
administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings. 
5: Alternative 
remittance 
Persons or entities engaged in formal or informal systems (e.g., hawala) of 
transferring funds ought to be bound by the same oversight as the banking 
sector.  
                                                 
18 FATF, “Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2001-2002,” Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering, February 1, 2002. 
19 James Jackson, “CRS Report for Congress: The Financial Action Task Force- An Overview,” 
Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21904, Updated March 4, 2005. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Data on this table are derived from multiple sources: Dayanath Jayasuriya, “Money laundering and 
terrorism financing: The role of capital market regulators,” Journal of Financial Crime, 10(1) (2002): 30-
36 in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 154647481) (accessed June 10, 2008); James 
Jackson, “CRS Report for Congress: The Financial Action Task Force-An Overview,” Congressional 
Research Service, Order Code RS21904, Updated March 4, 2005; Jackie Johnson, “Is the global financial 
system AML/CFT prepared?” Journal of Financial Crime, 15(1) (2008): 7-21, in the ABI/INFORM 
Global database (Document ID: 1440894781) (accessed June 10, 2008); Jackie Johnson (2008); FATF, 
“Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2001-2002,” Financial Action Task Force on Money 




Description of the Requirement 




Countries should ensure that non-profit organizations do not remain vulnerable 
to the use by terrorists to launder funds. 
8: Cross border 
transportation of 
currency 
Each country should emplace a mechanism or control system to record and 
detect cross-border transportation of currency and bearer instruments. 
 
Although the FATF Nine Special Recommendations appear straightforward, they 
are all subject to the interpretation of each participating country. A single agreed upon 
definition of terrorism or what constitutes a terrorist globally does not exist. Nations 
across the globe do not have access to the same level of resources and technology to 
implement these recommendations effectively. In some instances the legislative process 
is filled with red tape and bureaucracy that an agreed upon strategy could take years to 
implement. So what has happened with the international community’s efforts to combat 
terrorist financing seven years post 9/11 with respect to implementing the FATF Forty 
plus Nine Special Recommendations? James Jackson, Jackie Johnson, Jean-François 
Thony and Cheong-Ann Png seem to indicate that the implementation is slow, and the 
degree to which it has occurred varies.22 Johnson, Thony and Png found more countries 
complied with the implementation of the FATF Forty Recommendations than with the 
FATF Nine Special Recommendations.23  
                                                 
22 James Jackson, “CRS Report for Congress: The Financial Action Task Force- An Overview,” 
Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21904, Updated March 4, 2005, 2005. Johnson, “Is the 
global financial system AML/CFT prepared?, Journal of Financial Crime, 15(1) (2008): 7-21 in the 
ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1440894781) (accessed June 10, 2008); Jackie Johnson 
(2008). Third round FATF mutual evaluations indicate declining compliance from the Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 11(1), 47-66 in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1440896701) 
(accessed June 10, 2008); Jean-François Thony, Cheong-Ann Png, FATF, “Special Recommendations and 
UN Resolutions on the financing of terrorism: A review of the status of implementation and legal 
challenges faced by countries,” Journal of Financial Crime, 14(2) 2007: 150, in the ABI/INFORM 
Global database (Document ID: 1344349811) (accessed June 10, 2008).  
23 Jackie Johnson, “Is the global financial system AML/CFT prepared?” Journal of Financial 
Crime, 15(1) (2008): 7-21, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1440894781) (accessed 
June 10, 2008); Jackie Johnson, “Third round FATF mutual evaluations indicate declining compliance,” 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1) (2008): 47-66, in the ABI/INFORM Global database 
(Document ID: 1440896701) (accessed June 10, 2008); Jean-François Thony and Cheong-Ann Png,  
FATF. “Special Recommendations and UN Resolutions on the financing of terrorism: A review of the 
status of implementation and legal challenges faced by countries,” Journal of Financial Crime, 14(2) 
(2007): 150, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1344349811) (accessed June 10, 2008). 
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Part of the problem with the international community’s efforts to counter terrorist 
financing is, as Hardoiun and Weichhardt point out, “financial flows linked to terrorist 
actions are often very low and remain below the thresholds of financial control 
mechanisms.”24 Robert Vella-Baldacchino and Antonello Biagioli illustrate the 
complexity required to effectively implement security measures to monitor and report 
suspicious activity, particularly money laundering that may be funding terrorism.25 
Consequently, in Baldacchino and Biagioli’s illustration they also shed light on some of 
the reasons why the international community has such low compliance levels 
implementing the FATF Forty plus Nine Special Recommendations. Biagioli points out 
that much of the problems with the implementation of counter-measures lie in countries 
simply taking a reactive approach using traditional methods. He implies countries must 
be much more creative and innovative. Biagioli further proposes that countries must 
move toward anticipating criminal or terrorist actions and prevent their financing 
activities through the collection and sharing of information.26 In his study of the Malta 
Exchange, Baldacchino found the level of cooperation between the financial 
establishments and the specialized financial intelligence unit allowed the Malta 
authorities to quickly identify, detain, and prosecute economic criminals.27 Due to the 
inequality in capability across countries to implement a system of gathering or sharing 
information, terrorists can continue to exploit the financial systems to move money as 
well as make money. Terrorists and criminals are familiar with the monitoring and 
                                                 
24 Patrick Hardouin and Reiner Weichhardt. “Terrorist fund raising through criminal activities,” 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, 9(3) (2006): 303-308, in the ABI/INFORM Global database 
(Document ID: 1091265341) (accessed October 1, 2007). 
25 Robert Vella-Baldacchino, “Overview of a securities market strategy to prevent money laundering 
and terrorist financing: The Malta Stock Exchange's experience, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
9(3) (2006): 322-326, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1091265371) (accessed 
October 1, 2007); Antonello Biagioli, “Methodological innovation and effective action: Looking into 
synergies to countering economic crime,” Journal of Financial Crime, 13(3) (2006): 369 in the 
ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1073500451) (accessed October 1, 2007). 
26 Antonello Biagioli, “Methodological innovation and effective action: Looking into synergies to 
countering economic crime.” Journal of Financial Crime, 13(3) (2006): 369, in the ABI/INFORM 
Global database (Document ID: 1073500451) (accessed October 1, 2007). 
27 Robert Vella-Baldacchino, “Overview of a securities market strategy to prevent money laundering 
and terrorist financing: The Malta Stock Exchange's experience,” Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, 9(3) (2006): 322-326, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1091265371) 
(accessed October 1, 2007).  
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monetary thresholds. Through globalization as countries become more integrated and 
interdependent, terrorists will quickly adapt and exploit financial institutions or 
companies with weak control systems. Some of these examples will be evident in the 
case studies of Colombia, Peru, and Great Britain in the following chapters of this study. 
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II. COLOMBIA’S CASE 
A. BACKGROUND 
Colombia’s problematic democratic history began shortly after the country’s 
revolution against Spanish rule when it was part of Spain’s New Granada colony 
(Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador).28 From the time of its independence, two 
political parties have historically dominated Colombian politics: the Liberal and 
Conservative parties. The Liberal party “believed in a decentralized government, strong 
regional power, and a less influential role for the church,”29 while the Conservative party 
“believed in a strong central government and a powerful church.”30 On multiple 
occasions, the disparities between these two parties have divided the country and shaped 
Colombia’s violent history, including the creation of the FARC, ELN, and AUC.  
Of significance to the country’s present status and its war against drugs and 
terrorism is the period from 1946 to 1958 known as “La Violencia” which is said to have 
claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.31 In addition to the civil uprising and banditry 
that engulfed the country, this period was also marked with military repression. In 1958, 
to end the violence and turn the economy around, the two political parties formed a 
coalition known as the National Front.32 Unfortunately, the period of the National Front 
became characterized as repressive, limiting democratic liberties, and holding the country 
                                                 
28 New Granada achieved its independence in 1824 and became known as the Republic of Greater 
Colombia. In 1830, Ecuador and Venezuela separated. In 1903, Panama declared its independence from 
Colombia. This information was derived from the History of Colombia, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107419.html (accessed November 20, 2007).  
29 History of Colombia, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107419.html (accessed November 20, 
2007).  
30 Ibid. 
31 Peter DeShazo and Tanya Primiani, Phillip McLean, “Back From the Brink: Evaluating Progress in 
Colombia, 1999-2007,” CSIS Report, A Report of the Americas Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, November 2007. 
32 Under the National Front the presidency would alternate between a Liberal and a Conservative 
candidate every term for sixteen years (later extended to twenty-four years) without allowing entry by any 
other political entity. 
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under siege by using the military to control any opposition to the government.33 
Additionally although every Colombian citizen had a vote in the country’s political 
process, the rich landowners often threatened and coerced the peasants to vote, as they 
desired, further delegitimizing the democratic process. Consequently, the FARC and the 
ELN emerged in the 1960s as rural based movements with Marxist ideologies, which 
were opposed to the repressive National Front government. 
The FARC, founded in 1964, dedicated its movement to rural insurgency through 
the early 1980s, and it progressively became highly involved in illicit drug trade filling 
the vacuum left by the drug cartels.34 The ELN was also founded in 1964 but it had a 
“strong religious influence [and a] doctrine for insurrection inspired by the Cuban 
revolution.”35 The religious influence dissuaded, for a while, the ELN from becoming 
involved in the illicit drug trade. Eventually, however, they too became highly involved 
in the highly profitable drug trafficking.  
Also during the 1960s, because of the Colombian government’s inability to 
provide security to the rural parts of the country, landowners and local communities 
formed “self-defense” groups, the predecessors to the AUC, to counter the FARC and 
ELN. In 1968, the Colombian government passed Law 48 establishing the right of 
civilian self-defense militias to protect lives and property, which helped to create and 
legitimize the predecessors of the present day AUC.  
The government of Colombia would spend the next forty years fighting these 
Marxist guerilla groups as well as the right wing paramilitary groups it allowed to exist, 
and in some cases, helped to create. Today, the FARC, ELN, and AUC are on the U.S. 
State Department’s terrorist list. The strongest of the three remains the FARC, while the  
 
                                                 
33 Colombian Human Rights, Network Timeline of Colombian Recent History, (2007), 
http://colhrnet.igc.org/timeline.htm, (accessed December 12, 2007).  
34 Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani and Phillip McLean, “Back From the Brink: Evaluating Progress in 
Colombia, 1999-2007,” CSIS Report. A Report of the Americas Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, November 2007. 
35 A.K. Williams and Celso Andrade, International Terrorism Presentation: National Liberation Army 
Brief, Fall Quarter 2007, International Terrorism Course, Presented November 5, 2007 (Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).  
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majority of the AUC has demobilized. The FARC finances its activities through full 
range of drug trafficking, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution. Other FARC 
financing methods identified are kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking.36 The ELN 
remains active but weak; it finances its activities through taxation of the illegal narcotics 
industry as well as through kidnappings, hijackings, and extortion.37 In 2007, the 
Colombian government determined that the AUC no longer exists. However, the 
Colombian government estimates that 22 new criminal groups emerged from AUC 
members that refused to demobilize.38 These new AUC derivatives engage in criminal 
activity and seek to exploit the illicit drug market in Colombia.  
 B. THE ECONOMY 
Colombia ranks among the most progressive, industrializing countries in the 
world and has a diverse economy. “[Colombia] has a broad, rich resource base, skilled 
human resources, a modernizing manufacturing and consumer economy, a legal, 
regulatory, business and physical infrastructure conducive to productive business activity, 
and a long history of economic growth.”39  
Starting in 1991, under President Gaviria’s administration, Colombia’s economic 
liberalization opened the country’s economy to international trade and capital 
investments by non-Colombians. The economic liberalization entailed significant 
reductions in tariff duties, eliminating non-tariff barriers, actively negotiating free trade 
agreements, and reforming foreign exchange and tax legislation, labor regulations and the 
foreign investment regime. During the first six months of 2007, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) grew to $4 billion, which was three times the amount invested during  
 
 
                                                 
36 United States State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” (2007), 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/ (accessed August 2008). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 United States Embassy Bogota, U.S. Department of State FY 2001 Country Commercial Guide: 
Colombia, (2000), http://www.state.gov (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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the same period in 2006. The United States, Spain, and Brazil are the leading sources of 
FDI in Colombia. Colombia’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 6.8 percent in 2006 
and nearly 7 percent in the second quarter of 2007.40 
Poverty reduction has not been as successful, but there has been progress. In 
2006, an estimated 45 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. This was 
down from nearly 49.2 percent in 2005 and much improved from 60 percent in 2000.41 
The Colombian government has invested millions of dollars on social programs 
throughout the country to combat and reduce poverty. The programs provide subsidies, 
monetary support, as well as social, environmental, and/or productive technical assistance 
so that families can improve their income and become more involved in society. 
The Colombian currency is the peso (COP), which has been free floating since 
1997 in an effort to target and control inflation.42 As of June 5, 2008, the exchange rate 
of COP to the US dollar was COP1,840/US$143 while historical exchange rates are 
illustrated in Table 2. Note that the COP has strengthened relative to the U.S. dollar. This 
potentially provides an advantage in trade and investing to grow consumption in 
Colombia. However, since the U.S. is one of the leading FDI in Colombia, there may 
potentially be a slow down in exports.  
                                                 
40 Colleen W. Cook, “Colombia: Issues for Congress,” November 19, 2007, (2007), 
http://www.colombiaemb.org/docs/Reporte_de_Colombia_Congreso_US_2007.pdf (accessed June 5, 
2008). 
41 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Fact Book: Colombia, May 15, 2008, (2008), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html#Econ (accessed June 5, 2008). 
42 Andrew Berg, Monetary Regime Options for Latin America, Finance and Development, September 
2003, in the BOSUN database (accessed June 5, 2008), 24-27. 
43 “United States foreign exchange rate in Colombian pesos,” (June 5, 2008), 
http://finance.google.com/finance?q=$COP (accessed June 5, 2008). 
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C. THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND BANKING SYSTEM  
The Colombian Securities Market is small, but it has enjoyed high growth in 
recent years. Only the largest of Colombia's companies participate in the local stock or 
bond markets. The majority of companies meet their financing needs through the banking 
system, by reinvesting their profits, and through suppliers’ credit. Public demand for 
securities is generally low due to a combination of Colombians’ low personal savings and 
investment rates. Institutional investors, particularly the private pension funds that 
mobilize the largest share of national savings, concentrate their holdings in government 
paper and AAA-rated commercial paper, a rating given to only a handful of companies. 
The Colombian Securities Commission and Exchange oversees the stock exchange, 
regulates market intermediaries, broker’s fees, and the financial disclosure of listed 
companies. Colombia’s judicial system defines the legal rights of commercial entities, 
reviews regulatory enforcement procedures and adjudicates contract disputes in the 
business community. 
Over the last few years, the securities market has traded fewer stocks and more 
bonds and fixed income securities.45 In 2003, Colombia’s Stock Exchange registered 
                                                 
44 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Fact Book: Colombia, May 15, 2008, (2008), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html#Econ (accessed June 5, 2008). 
45 United States State Department, “2006 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – Colombia,” 
(2006), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2006/62320.htm (accessed May 22, 2008). 
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marked dynamism, mainly due to economic growth, with record annual GDP growth of 
4.3%,46 and the appreciation of the Colombian peso. The government of Colombia has 
incentivized foreign investment through a multitude of laws and decrees, which allow 
flexibility for growth and development.47 Colombia imposes the same investment 
restrictions on foreign investors that it does on national investors. All investors must 
obtain a license from the Commission of Companies and register with the local Chamber 
of Commerce. Foreign investments must register with the Central Bank’s foreign 
exchange office within three months of the transaction date to ensure repatriation of 
profits and remittances and to access official foreign exchange.  
Liberalization of Colombia’s financial service industry in the early 1990s 
permitted 100 percent foreign ownership of financial institutions. However, the 
Colombian Banking Superintendence must approve all foreign direct investment of ten 
percent or more in a Colombian financial entity. Likewise, the Banking Superintendence 
must provide authorization to portfolio investments in the financial sector through foreign 
investment funds that plan to acquire equity participation of five percent or more. The use 
of foreign personnel in financial institutions is limited to administrators, legal 
representatives, and technicians.  
In 2005, Colombia consolidated supervision of the banking and securities sectors 
under the Financial Superintendence. Bank and other financial institution operations are 
limited through legislation that requires separation of fiduciary, investment banking, 
commercial loans, leasing, and insurance services, from banking services. Banking 
institutions may develop all these different activities in the same office or building, but 
must have separate management at the heads of these services.48  
A tax on financial transactions is applied to all withdrawals from checking and 
savings accounts, including accounts with the Central Bank. Withdrawals from savings 
                                                 
46 “Indicators, The Economist U.S. Edition,” The Economist, March 6, 2004, in the Nexis® database 
(accessed July 21, 2008). 
47 United States State Department, “2006 Investment Climate Statement – Colombia,” (2006) 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2006/62320.htm (accessed May 22, 2008). 
48 Ibid. 
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accounts for the purchase of low-income housing, transactions on the inter-bank market, 
and the sale or purchase of foreign currency are exempt from the tax. Electronic 
securities transactions, including stock market transactions, are also exempt from the 
tax.49 
The estimated total assets of the country’s main banks as of 2007 were 
approximately $194 billion and foreign-owned banks controlled 20 percent of the sector 
assets. Past-due loans accounted for 3.3 percent of the total banking portfolio while the 
banks’ return on equity was 19.5 percent. The financial system registered profits of 
approximately $4.3 billion from January to November 2007.50  
D. INTERNAL AUDITING AND MONITORING 
Financial markets in Colombia and particularly corporations are subject to the 
rules and auditing procedures of the Securities Commission and Exchange. Similarly, the 
financial institutions are subject to monitoring and auditing by the Banking 
Superintendence. The Statute of the Financial System, Decree-Law 663 of 1993, outlines 
all the specific information that financial institutions must collect from clients and the 
penalties for non-compliance.51 The data required are extensive and may well serve as a 
strong deterrent for misuse of the system.  
The Banking Superintendence performs its control function through the analysis 
of the information provided by the financial institutions under its control and supervision, 
as well as through annual visits. In addition to the controls placed by the Banking 
Superintendence, the rules on money laundering prevention and detection among banking 
institutions are also subject to a triple control through a Compliance Officer, Internal 
Auditor and External Auditor of each institution.52 Further, the Banking Superintendent,  
 
                                                 
49 United States State Department, “2006 Investment Climate Statement – Colombia,” (2006), 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2006/62320.htm (accessed May 22, 2008). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Asobancaria, “IRS Requirements to Rate the Colombian “Know Your Client” Policy,” Colombian 
Asobancaria, (2001), www.asobancaria.com/upload/docs/docPub2609_1.doc (accessed June 3, 2008).  
52 Ibid. 
 20
through the “know your client” policy, requires banks to keep documentation of owner 
identity and origin of funds for cash transactions that meet the criteria illustrated in 
Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Colombian Bank Criteria for Retaining Owner Identity53 
E. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
Colombia is one of the four nations worldwide participating as a pilot country in 
the G8 anti-corruption and transparency initiative.54 Colombia is also a member of the 
Financial Action Task Force of South America Against Money Laundering (GAFISUD), 
created in Cartagena Colombia on December 8, 2000.55 GAFISUD’s purpose is to work 
toward developing and implementing a comprehensive global strategy to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing. GAFISUD carries this charter as outlined by the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) Forty Recommendations and 
FATF Nine Special Recommendations.56 Based on a recent study of the level of 
                                                 
53 Data for Figure 1 were derived from Asobancaria (2001). Asobancaria, “IRS Requirements to Rate 
the Colombian “Know Your Client” Policy,” Colombian Asobancaria, (2001), 
www.asobancaria.com/upload/docs/docPub2609_1.doc (accessed on June 3, 2008). 
54 The G8 Group is an unofficial forum of the heads of the leading industrialized democracies (Russia, 
the U.S., Britain, France, Japan, Germany, Canada and Italy), where the European Commission is also 
represented and fully participates. This forum was designed to harmonize attitudes to acute international 
problems. The member states account for 49% of global exports, 51% of industrial output, and 49% of 
assets in the International Monetary Fund, http://en.g8russia.ru/g8/history/shortinfo/, (accessed on July 16, 
2008). 
55 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Developed (OECD), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/44/0,3343,en_32250379_32236869_34355875_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 
July 16, 2008). GAFISUD was created on December 8, 2000 in Cartagena, Colombia by means of a 
memorandum of understanding by representatives of the governments of nine South American countries. 
56 James Jackson, “CRS Report for Congress: The Financial Action Task Force- An Overview,” 
Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21904, Updated March 4, 2005. 
1) Transactions above US$10,000 or COP10,000,000 
2) Transactions of US$750 or its equivalent in other currencies if through 
money exchange bureaus 
3) Transactions of US$500 or its equivalent in other currencies if through 
special or borderline money exchange bureaus  
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compliance with implementation of the FATF Forty plus Nine Special Recommendations 
between FATF members and non-members, Colombia was listed at 63 percent 
compliance and 17 percent compliance, respectively.57 Of note, in close cooperation with 
the U.S., Colombia has provided its Specially Designated Nationals List and the U.S. 
Treasury Department through the Office of Foreign Assets Control pursued and blocked 
the assets of narcotics traffickers and terrorists.58 
F. ANALYSIS 
The early elitist Colombian society ensured that the governing power and wealth 
remained in their hands under the guise of the democratic political two-party system 
where only the elite benefited. By creating this imbalance of power, the elite ensured that 
the poor peasant class felt they would not have a voice or political stance in the absence 
of a radical change. This ideology for radical change manifested itself in the formation of 
groups such as the FARC, the ELN, as well as other left-wing groups.59 Additionally, the 
rule of law and the government were weak. To exacerbate the lack of or diminished rule 
of law in rural areas, the numerous corrupt politicians, law enforcement personnel, and 
military leaders undermined the democratic political process. The most recent case is the 
“para-politics scandal” where ex-AUC commanders and collaborators in prison 
implicated numerous government officials ranging from police, military leaders, 
politicians, to judges in collaborating with the paramilitaries.60 All these shortcomings in 
equality, liberty, and the rule of law created the landscape for the FARC, ELN and AUC 
to prosper.  
 
                                                 
57 Jackie Johnson, “Is the global financial system AML/CFT prepared?” Journal of Financial 
Crime, 15(1) (2008): 7-21, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1440894781) (accessed 
June 10, 2008). 
58 United States State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” (2007), 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103710.htm (accessed August 2008). 
59 David Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James 
Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism, 46-73. 
60 Juan Forero, “Colombian Unravels Government-Paramilitary Ties Imprisoned Ex-Official Is 
Central Witness in Scandal Shaking U.S. Ally,” The Washington Post, March 20, 2007, DC Edition: F 
Section: A Section, A16. 
 22
Colombia’s economy is thriving, and although culturally the general population is 
not keen on investing or saving, the returns in the financial systems provide a lucrative 
venue to raise funds for those willing to take the risks. The FARC, ELN, and AUC may 
engage in raising their finances by purchasing stocks going through an intermediary 
broker or corporation to ensure the activity appears legitimate. In addition, if not to just 
raise funds, this may also prove an effective way to launder money from their illicit drug 
activities. 
Typically, bank-to-bank transactions are not questioned due to the presumed 
compliance with the regulations and laws within banks in Colombia, and therefore, are 
exploitable. A potential exploitable limitation in the banking sector is the “know your 
client” criteria shown in Figure 1. The FARC, ELN, or AUC can readily have numerous 
intermediaries open and operate bank accounts. With these multiple bank accounts, the 
FARC, ELN, or AUC can perform cash transactions within the thresholds depicted in 
Figure 1. All such cash transactions would serve as an easy and undetectable way to 
launder money brought into the country illegally. Another exploitable vulnerability of the 
banking sector is the lack of enforcement of the Statute of the Financial System, Decree-
Law 663 of 1993.61 The law serves as sustainable internal control as long as those at helm 
responsible for the enforcement actually abide by the law. The key element for terrorists 
to take advantage of the Colombian financial infrastructure to launder, transfer, and 
invest their funds is to incentivize (bribe) personnel within the control systems to allow 
them entry.  
The number of foreign owned banks in Colombia provides the FARC, ELN, and 
AUC the gateway to their international financing activities (i.e., remittance of illicit funds 
from the exportation of drugs worldwide). As technology advances, and the 
interconnectivity amongst financial institutions worldwide grow, the FARC, ELN, and 
AUC will be able to move and control funds around the world through a couple of key 
strokes via the internet.  
                                                 
61 Asobancaria, “IRS Requirements to Rate the Colombian “Know Your Client” Policy,” Colombian 
Asobancaria, (2001), www.asobancaria.com/upload/docs/docPub2609_1.doc (accessed on June 3, 2008). 
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The purchase of foreign currency is also a very likely tactic especially for the 
FARC and ELN to launder drug money smuggled into the country. The illicit cash can be 
dispersed amongst several, presumably reputable, individuals or corporations so that they 
may legitimately purchase the foreign currency and effectively launder the money. An 
added bonus of buying any foreign currency is that it is exempt from taxes so potentially 
less money is lost in transaction costs.  
In those parts of the country where the terrorists have control, they will continue 
to raise funds through the normal modes of extortion, kidnapping, smuggling, illegal drug 
production and trafficking, and through legitimate businesses, which have the added 
advantage of avoiding taxes. A thriving investment rich Colombia provides the 
opportunity for legitimate business to grow and expand internationally. As legitimate 
business expand and grow so does the opportunity exploitation by the FARC, ELN, and 
AUC. An example of great proportions was the extortion of banana exporters, 
presumably over $7.1 million in the span of seven years.62   
The continued risk for the Colombian government in the terrorist capability to 
sustain the fight lies in the high percentage of the population living in poverty.63 As the 
country continues to prosper economically, the divide between the poor and the 
remaining 55 percent of the population is not narrowed down, Colombia may well see the 
negative effects of globalization magnified.64 As Gotchev suggests, although there is no 
conclusive evidence that poverty and inequality are directly linked to terrorism, there is 
evidence that economic deprivation gives rise to demands for political change. In some 
cases, interested groups seeking the political change resort to terrorism to achieve their 
goals. Elements of the FARC, AUC, and ELN have resorted to terrorism by taking 
advantage of the existing inequalities in the past, and currently, the socioeconomic 
                                                 
62 EFE News Service, “Colombian Militias May Have Received Over $7 mn from Growers,” EFE 
News Service, Bogota Colombia, February 6, 2007, from the Global NewsBank online (2008), 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com (accessed August 2007). 
63 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Fact Book: Colombia, May 15, 2008, (2008), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html#Econ (accessed June 5, 2008). 
According to the CIA in 2006, 45 percent of the population lived in poverty or below the poverty line in 
Colombia. 
64 Atanas Gotchev, “The Roots of Terrorism,” Terrorism and Globalization, ed. Louise Richardson, 
2006, 103-115. 
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environment in Colombia continues to lend itself for them to continue to operate. The 
FARC, ELN, or AUC may incentivize the poor to become intermediaries for the 
terrorists’ money laundering activities. These willing recruits needing to provide for their 
families can establish bank accounts through which small amounts of unlawful money 
can enter virtually undetected through international remittance. They can lend themselves 
to be the legitimate figureheads of fictitious enterprises or even legitimate businesses 
whose licit purpose is to launder money. They may lend themselves to be the “mules” 
that transport the unlawful money for currency conversion.65 
A potential negative effect on FARC, ELN, and AUC current financing activities 
is the weakening of the U.S. dollar relative to the COP. Terrorists, particularly the FARC 
and ELN, may see their capacity of direct exportation of drugs to the U.S. diminish if 
exportation of legitimate goods has a significant drop. Given that simulated export of 
agricultural products is one of many methods that illegal goods and drugs are smuggled 
out of the country, the FARC and ELN may see their finances decrease.66 Another hazard 
for the FARC and ELN financing activities from the drop of the exchange rate is their 
capability to exploit the black market peso exchange or the international foreign 
exchange arbitrage. Under the scenario of a weak U.S. dollar, the cost of doing business 
abroad for the FARC and ELN will likely increase.67 If the U.S. dollar is weak, that 
equates to less revenue for them in terms of the amount of COP they can get for their 
drug in U.S. dollars. 
The good news is that although the FARC and elements of the AUC and ELN 
continue to operate in Colombia, the current government is making it harder for them to 
survive. Through legislation and implementation of reforms that meet the FATF Forty 
plus Nine Special Recommendations, the Colombian government has cut off some of the 
FARC, AUC, and ELN’s avenues for financial resources.  
                                                 
65 GAFISUD, “Regional Typologies – GAFISUD 2005,” (2005), 
http://www.gafisud.org/tipologias.asp?idseccion=8. (accessed August 13, 2008). 
66 Ibid. An example of how simulated exports of agricultural goods is as follows: fake fruits are 
strategically placed intermixed within a shipment of real fruit and they are exported from one country to the 
U.S. undetected. 
67 GAFISUD, “Regional Typologies – GAFISUD 2005,” (2005), 
http://www.gafisud.org/tipologias.asp?idseccion=8 (accessed August 13, 2008). 
 25
III. ANALYSIS OF TWO ADDITIONAL CASES 
A. CASE SELECTION AND COMPARISON FACTORS 
Colombia is not alone in the failures to effectively combat terrorism. Other 
examples of terrorist movements democracies dealt with poorly were the “Sendero 
Luminoso” (Shining Path) (SL) in Peru, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 
Northern Ireland, Great Britain. Besides the flaws in the democratic processes, other 
factors have facilitated terrorism in these countries, such as the economic processes and 
system, the operations of financial markets, and the banking systems. This chapter 
compares the selected factors listed in Figure 2 across two additional countries in an 
effort to examine how terrorist organizations have taken advantage of the gaps in these 
systems to raise their finances.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Case Examination Factors 
The factors selected for comparing the effects of globalization and free markets 
on terrorist financing facilitation provided an effective means of analyzing how terrorists 
may be exploiting these systems. In each country, the governance and regime, the 
economy, the financial markets, and the banking systems are diverse enough to illustrate 
the realm of possible factors that terrorists have at their disposal. Policy makers can in 
turn use these factors identified in their efforts to counter terrorist financing and the 
development of international cooperation. 
1) The economy 
2) The financial markets and banking system 
3) Auditing and internal monitoring 
4) International cooperation 
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B. PERU’S SENDERO LUMINOSO 
1. Background 
In 1980, the SL emerged as a Leftist group with a mixed Maoist-Marxist 
ideology. As the ELN and FARC in Colombia initiated as a peasant rural movement 
against a repressive government, the SL movement in Peru invoked the indigenous 
people of Peru to take arms and revolt against the oppressive government who 
persistently failed to recognize their rights although they comprised more than fifty 
percent of the population.68 The Peruvian government’s tactics in dealing with SL were 
heavy-handed and indiscriminate resulting in further repression of the indigenous 
people’s civil liberties.69 
The Peruvian government sent in the military in 1982 as a response to the 
atrocities committed by SL. Unfortunately, the military was ill prepared and untrained on 
who they were to target, they did not speak the language nor had intelligence of the area, 
and they used torture tactics to extract the information from those they captured. As a 
result, SL revolted by inciting prisoners to act as well as conducting more acts of terror 
by presenting the movement as a “Just cause that is worth much more than an individuals 
life.”70 The counter effect was impunity for the army; military control was exerted over 
the indigenous areas and the extermination of whole villages took place. 
The Peruvian government ignored the grievances of the poor and unrepresented 
class and used the military unsuccessfully to suppress the terrorist movement. The 
Peruvian government also armed the indigenous people of the Amazon so they could 
protect themselves from the SL. Notably, in Peru, the repression of civil liberties in the 
name of providing security caused a radical change from a democratic government to an 
authoritarian regime. 
                                                 
68 “State of Fear,” Video presentation about Sendero Luminoso in Peru (Monterey, CA: Naval 





The SL does not exist in Peru to the extent that it did in the 1980s and 1990s but 
remnants do exist and have continued to launch attacks against the Peruvian government. 
More prominently, as reported by the U.S. State Department, in 2007, the SL was 
engaged in narco-trafficking and was responsible for the deaths of 11 police officers, 20 
civilians and a member of the military.71 In recent years, SL involvement in drug 
production and trafficking has provided funding. These funds facilitate SL operations, 
improve relations with local communities in remote areas, and facilitate the recruitment 
of new members.72 
2. The Economy 
Peru's economy is diverse. However, overdependence on minerals and metals 
subjects the economy to fluctuations in world prices for these metals and commodities. 
Growth depends heavily on exports of minerals, textiles, and agricultural products, and 
on expectations for the success of natural gas and other potential energy projects under 
development. In addition, the lack of infrastructure deters trade and investment. The 
Peruvian economy grew by more than four percent per year during the period 2002-06. 
Growth jumped to 7.5 percent in 2007, driven by higher world prices for minerals and 
metals.73 
In an effort to promote economic stabilization and liberalization policies, during 
the early 1990s, the Peruvian government lowered trade barriers, lifted restrictions on 
capital flows and opened the economy to foreign investors. As a result, Peru experienced 
marked growth in foreign investment from 1993-1998. In April 2002 of ProInversion, a 
robust privatization agency was established as part of a government effort to stimulate 
growth and investment.  
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Peru’s poverty rate and underemployment are high. A reported 44.5 percent of the 
Peruvian population lived below the poverty line as of 2006. Also in 2006, 
unemployment was estimated at 7.4 percent in the country’s capital while a reported 
widespread underemployment existed in the rest of the nation.  
The currency of Peru is the Nuevo Sol (PEN). The PEN has traded with the U.S. 
dollar for the past five years as illustrated in Table 3 and has experienced little fluctuation 
in the exchange rate. Since the PEN has strengthened relative to the U.S. dollar, this may 
potentially provide an advantage in trade and investing to increase consumption in Peru. 







3. The Financial Markets and Banking System 
Considered competitive, the Peruvian banking industry offers services to business 
customers while the private sector has access to numerous and various credit instruments. 
In recent years, the demand for securities has greatly exceeded supply driving private 
pension funds to compete with financial companies for bonds issued by companies. From 
January through early December 2007, firms placed $1.67 billion on the local bond 
market. By November 2007, pension funds managed a total of $20.2 billion, a 47 percent  
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surge over the November 2006 level. In addition, the Central Bank of Peru has placed a 
20 percent cap on pension fund investments abroad; thereby, providing Peruvian bond 
issuers, including the government, and loan seekers with a captive market. 
The Peruvian banking system is generally considered sound. Through sensible 
supervision, combined with competition, a significant consolidation in the banking sector 
has emerged. The consolidation has revamped operations, increased capitalization, and 
reduced costs. Currently twelve commercial banks comprise the system and three banks 
account for just over three-fourths of loans and almost four-fifths of deposits. The system 
also has three specialized institutions and 39 thriving micro-lenders and savings banks. 
As of November 2006, foreigners had significant shares in nine banks, of which they 
were majority owners of four commercial banks. Total assets of the commercial banks 
were $29.8 billion at the end of June 2007. As of November 2007, 1.3 percent of total 
loans were assessed as non-performing, down from a high of 11 percent recorded in 
2001.75  
Close families or associates generally control ownership of Peruvian corporations 
and hostile takeovers are practically non-existent. Larger private firms are known to use 
“cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict investment by 
those they consider outsiders. However, Peruvian law and regulations do not authorize or 
encourage private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association to limit or restrict 
foreign participation. There are also no private or public sector efforts to restrict foreign 
participation in industry standards-setting organizations. Foreign direct investment 
registered with ProInversion as of the end of 2006 was $15.37 billion. According to U.S. 
State Department analysis, ProInversion estimated growth of private foreign direct 
investment would reach $20.00 billion in 2008. Foreign dematerialized holdings of 
securities totaled $9.6 billion in October 2006.76 
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4. Internal Auditing and Monitoring 
The National Commission for the Supervision of Companies, Securities and 
Exchanges, (CONASEV) is the Peruvian government entity charged with the study, 
promotion, and regulation of the securities and commodities markets. Additionally, 
CONASEV is charged with the control of market participants, the maintenance of a 
transparent and orderly market, the setting of accounting standards and the publication of 
financial information about covered companies. All firms, listed on the Lima Stock 
Exchange or the Public Registry of Securities, are vetted by CONASEV.  
Stock issuers are required to inform CONASEV and the relevant stock exchange 
in charge of supervising the centralized trading mechanism of events that affect or might 
affect the stock, the company, or any public offerings. The end state of these 
requirements is to promote market transparency, and prevent monopolies and fraud.77 
5. International Cooperation 
Peru has ratified both the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the 
Organization of American States' Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Peru is 
not a member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
and nor has signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Like Colombia, Peru is 
a member of GAFISUD and works toward meeting the FATF Forty plus Nine Special 
Recommendations for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. As concerns 
compliance with the implementation of the FATF Forty plus Nine Special 
Recommendations, Peru was found 65 and 50 percent compliant, respectively.78 
Peru is also one of the four nations worldwide participating as a pilot country in 
the G8 anti-corruption and transparency initiative. An action plan encompassing the 
following six areas was develop with assistance from the G8 partners and Non 
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Governmental Organizations: citizen information/internet connectivity; improving central 
government fiscal transparency; developing government of Peru procurement systems; 
improving regional/local government transparency and management; improving 
transparency of extractive industry revenues; and developing asset forfeiture systems and 
legislation.79 
6. Analysis 
The Peruvian people did not experience equality, liberty, and the rule of law. 
They were subjugated to a militant dictatorship whose leader was ultimately interested in 
self-preservation and not the preservation of democracy. This provided the landscape for 
SL to exist and seize control of the rural areas of the country. Consequently, through 
control of the rural parts of the country, SL has also taken control of the production and 
distribution of cocaine, which is quite profitable.80  
Although the SL does not exist in Peru to the extent that it did in the 1980s and 
1990s, remnants do exist. Of particular concern are the levels of possible monetary 
incentives that the SL may offer and provide to the numerous Peruvians living in poverty 
(from earlier in this study a reported 44.5 percent of the population live in poverty). The 
inherent risk for the government of Peru is that the current wave of SL members picks up 
momentum and the required financing through the lucrative narcotics black market. The 
SL may readily exploit the poor and have them engage in the same type of illicit activities 
as were hypothesized for Colombia. Some of those financing activities may include 
establishing bank accounts through which small amounts of unlawful money can enter 
virtually undetected through international remittance or small cash transactions. They can 
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whose licit purpose is to launder money. They may also become the “mules” that 
transport the unlawful money for currency conversion, or just transport cocaine across the 
world.81 
The familial ties in the Peruvian corporate world may provide a formidable barrier 
to entry for the SL to engage in financing their activities through the securities and 
futures markets and business. However, depending on the monetary leverage SL may 
have in the international arena through its narcotics enterprise, SL may have the capacity 
to setup legitimate companies abroad that conduct business with Peruvian corporations.  
SL would then be able to engage in simulated foreign investment in a local company.82 In 
such a case, the SL may take advantage of a local company in financial need or difficulty 
and provides economic backing from the foreign company. The foreign funds would 
legitimately enter the country and the local company would have to pay the debt plus 
interest. SL would have laundered its illicit funds and potentially made a further profit 
because of the added interests.  
Although the Peruvian economy and banking system are assessed as performing 
soundly and very low volatility is seen in the PEN to U.S. exchange rate for the past five 
years, the Peruvian government must continue to be vigilant and proactive in combating 
terrorism and meeting the requirements of GAFISUD. If the upper class in Peru continues 
to prosper while little is gained in an effort to relieve the plight of the poor, then SL may 
potentially have the opportunity to grow to what it once was. Given the large number of 
foreign owned banks in Peru, this provides the SL the required access to their 
international financing activities (i.e., remittance of illicit funds from the exportation of 
drugs worldwide). Technological advances and the connectivity amongst financial 
institutions worldwide also facilitate SL’s movement and control funds around the world 
through the simple use of computer. In addition, the purchase of foreign currency is a 
likely tactic for the SL to launder drug money smuggled into the country. The drug 
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money can be dispersed amongst several individuals or small front businesses and they 
may legitimately purchase foreign currency while effectively laundering the illicit funds. 
C. GREAT BRITAIN’S IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
1. Background 
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged from both real and perceived 
inequalities experienced by the Catholics in Northern Ireland in the 1960s and forward. 
The sentiment amongst the Catholics was of unequal treatment under the existing British 
law and so they embarked on a civil rights movement in 1968 with the slogan of “one 
man, one vote.”83 However, as described by Paul Arthur, the system at the time in 
Northern Ireland was such that only those who paid local taxes had the right to vote. The 
Catholics typically were the poorer citizens, lacked jobs, did not pay taxes, and therefore, 
could not vote in local elections. The idea of “one man, one vote” threatened the status 
quo and political power of the Northern Ireland Protestants whom believed this would 
lead to the revival of the “old Nationalist and Republican cause of [uniting] Ireland.”84 
Inevitably, by reacting with strong opposition against the Catholics’ demand, the local 
Northern Ireland government accomplished what they sought to crush or avoid, which 
was the emergence of the IRA. 
Key events changed the landscape under which the IRA operated once Catholics 
saw that the concessions promised by the British government under the civil rights 
campaign were slow in coming. As the Catholics weariness with both the British and 
Belfast governments grew, so did the desire by the IRA for “more punitive military 
action.”85 The need for more militant action was answered in “the Battle of the Bogside” 
                                                 
83 Paul Arthur, “Behind the Mask: the IRA and Sinn Fein “The Conflict,” PBS and WBH Frontline 
(1998), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/ (accessed November 13, 2007). 
84 Paul Arthur, “Behind the Mask: the IRA and Sinn Fein “The 1968 Civil Rights Movement,” PBS 
and WBH Frontline (1998), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/ (accessed 
November 13, 2007). 
85 Ibid. 
 34
and “the Burnings in Belfast” in 1969 and later “Bloody Sunday” in 1972.”86 In all three 
instances, the Catholics became convinced that they would not find justice and equality in 
Northern Ireland as presented by the British Army’s excessive use of force against them 
using tear gas at the Bogside and Belfast and the killing of unarmed civilians during a 
civil rights march.87 Rather than uphold the civil liberties of all its citizens, the British 
government became a repressor for all Catholics in Northern Ireland.  
The Catholics in Northern Ireland did not trust the British or the Belfast central 
governments to provide protection nor ensure equality for all. The overreaction of the 
British Army, once viewed as protectors, became the catalysts for an all out urban war 
with the IRA. The vehicles of democracy failed to acknowledge the true civil status of the 
poor Catholics in Northern Ireland. Once more what was seen were those in power 
refusing to yield or share it due to a long history (the scope of which cannot be covered in 
this study) of strife between the Catholics and Protestants in Ireland.88 The Protestant 
elite with their control of the government in Belfast refused to see the benefits of any 
concessions to the Catholics’ requests, and the Catholics grew impatient with what little 
the Belfast, and British governments actually did for them. In Northern Ireland, all three 
pieces, equality, liberty, and rule of law, that embody democracy, failed and terrorism 
was able to flourish.89 
2. The Economy 
Great Britain, a leading trading power and financial center, is one of the quintet of 
trillion dollar economies of Western Europe. Over the past two decades, the government 
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has greatly reduced public ownership and contained the growth of social welfare 
programs. The current government has been speeding up the improvement of education, 
health services, and affordable housing at a cost in higher taxes and a widening public 
deficit. In 2006, an estimated 14 percent of the population lived below the poverty line 
and the unemployment rate was estimated at 5.4 percent in 2007. 90  
The British Pound is a strong currency and has traded with the U.S. dollar in the 
past five years as illustrated in Table 4 ranging from 0.6125£/US$1 in 2003 with a 
moderate decline across the years to 0.4993£/US$1 in 2007.  







3. Financial Market and Banking System 
London houses one of the largest and most comprehensive financial markets. 
London offers all forms of financial services: commercial banking; investment banking; 
insurance; venture capital; stock and currency brokers; fund managers; commodity 
dealers; accounting and legal services; as well as electronic clearing and settlement 
systems and bank payments systems.92 Great Britain’s banking sector is the largest in  
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Europe, with some 350 banks authorized to do business in the country. The total assets of 
Great Britain’s banking sector were approximately $12.4 trillion in 2006, with domestic 
banks accounting for about 46 percent.93 
On November 1, 2007, the European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) law came into effect. The MiFID law gives “European Union 
securities exchanges, multilateral trading facilities and investment firms a “single 
passport” to operate throughout the European Union (EU) on the basis of authorization in 
their home Member States.”94 Although Great Britain is not a member of the EU, the 
passage of the MiFID has a direct impact on who conducts business with Great Britain 
across EU markets. 
4. Internal Auditing and Monitoring 
Regulations on legal, regulatory and accounting standards are published and are 
applied by the single regulatory body, the Financial Services Authority. In terms of 
accounting standards and audit provisions, as of January 1, 2005, firms in Great Britain 
must use the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) set by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and approved by the European Commission.95  
The information required to open an account in Great Britain’s banking system is 
not rigorous; however, monitoring is. Applicants must provide an official identification, 
such as a passport, a local address and for foreigners both a local and foreign address as 
well as a banking reference letter from their foreign residency. Banks have the means of 
cross-referencing the information provided by the applicant with other national banks as 
well as some international banks based on international banking agreements. In 
accordance with the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, financial institutions are required to 
submit Suspicious Activity Reports to the national level Serious Organized Crime 
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Agency on suspicious transactions detected/suspected within their organization.96 The 
financial institutions warn clients of the ways in which privileged information provided 
as part of the application process may be used.97   
5. International Cooperation 
Great Britain subscribes to the OECD Committee on Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises' National Treatment Instrument and the OECD Code on Capital 
Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT). The principles involved in legal, 
regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent, and they are consistent with 
international standards. Great Britain's Accounting Standards Board provides guidance to 
firms on accounting standards and works with the IASB on international standards.98 
Great Britain is also a member of the FATF. To date, of the three countries under 
comparison in this study, Great Britain is the most complaint with the implementation 
and ratification of the UN Resolutions in accordance with the FATF Forty plus Nine 
Special Recommendations.99 In comparison with FATF members as well as non-
members, with the same purpose of combating money laundering and terrorist financing, 
Great Britain was on average 70 percent compliant with implementation of the Forty 
Recommendations and 82 percent compliant with implementation of the Nine Special 
Recommendations.  
6. Analysis 
In an effort to provide protection to the people of Northern Ireland, the British 
government overreacted and was heavy handed. The overreaction was in part due to the 
lack of understanding of long existent friction between the Catholics and Protestants in 
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Northern Ireland. Both the British government and the Catholic community experienced 
real and perceived threats to their survival in Northern Ireland. The British government 
took a leap from non-involvement to outright military intervention. To the Northern 
Ireland Catholics, the fight became one for their survival rather than for simply civil 
liberties.  
There was no rule of law, civil society, strong state, or needed rules and ideals 
since the Catholics felt they were under siege from the Protestants and British 
government; in their view, the needed rules and ideals only seemed to benefit the 
Protestants. Free flow of information consisted of self-reinforcing information within the 
Catholic enclaves. Lastly, for the Catholics, there was no sustainable economic and social 
development in Northern Ireland since the existing laws did little to allow them to be part 
of the democratic process that enabled sustainable economic and social development. 
The economic condition for Catholics in Northern Ireland rendered the alternative 
for raising funds and financing the IRA activities through criminal endeavors as well as 
establishing their own legitimate businesses.100 Today, there appears to be little evidence 
from examining the British economy and financial institutions and instruments that 
criminals or terrorists such as the IRA could readily exploit them for financial gain. 
However, what does render Great Britain vulnerable to illicit criminal and financial 
activity is its business dealing with neighbors across the globe whose control mechanisms 
are weak. The notable exploitable vulnerabilities of the British economy and financial 
institutions include the passing of the MiFID in the EU and the low levels of 
implementation of the FATF Forty plus Nine Special Recommendations by other FATF 
members. The MiFID law allows for a high potential of transnational illicit financing and 
money laundering activities given the “single passport” in the EU.101  
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As pointed out earlier, Great Britain has the highest compliance rate of 
implementation of the FATF Forty plus Nine Special Recommendations of the three 
countries studied. Additionally, Great Britain is among the top four countries with the 
highest compliance rate of implementation of the FATF Forty Recommendations and has 
the top compliance rate of implementation of the Nine Special Recommendations.102 
However, low compliance by other nations allows infiltration of weaker financial 
markets, and consequently, renders Great Britain vulnerable. This phenomenon though is 
not unique to Great Britain but is symptomatic of the varying degree of vulnerability of 
all world markets and banking institutions through globalization and the varying levels of 
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IV. LOOKING AHEAD – CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
As Dobriansky pointed out, “States with liberal institutions and democratic 
systems can…respond to terror with greater public support and, in the long run, greater 
effectiveness than authoritarian states can.”103 In all three cases, in Colombia with the 
emergence of the FARC, ELN, and AUC, in Peru with SL, and in Great Britain with the 
IRA, the democratic governments initially had failures combating terrorism. This was 
primarily due to an inadequate use of the tools at their disposal and dismissing terrorism 
as a problem of the poor and under-represented.  
In Colombia, Peru and Great Britain, the governments were heavy handed 
through use of the military. In all cases, there was an endemic mistrust of civic leaders 
and government officials. This was rooted in the repressive history, endemic corruption 
of civic leaders and government officials, and the disproportionate balance of power 
between the elite and the underprivileged. A nation without civil liberties, equal 
representation of all its constituents, and rule of law and security, or sense of security, can 
be the breading ground for terrorism. This was true in all three cases, where groups 
within the society felt their grievances were not being addressed by the political 
mechanism in place. Since the governments of Colombia, Peru and Great Britain allowed 
lawlessness to rise up, they provided fertile ground for the FARC, ELN, AUC, SL, and 
IRA elements to thrive. 
The economy and monetary systems are relatively stable in all three nations. 
There is no indication in the literature that any is at risk of an economic downfall. In all 
three cases today, there appears to exist a sense of confidence in the government as well 
as the legislation and reforms for economic growth and stability with the rest of the 
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world. However, the sense of confidence in the government, economy, and financial 
institutions and markets must be tempered with adequate internal and external controls. 
Terrorist and criminal organizations fully take advantage of all these mechanisms to 
finance their activities. Terrorists invest in the stock markets, they funnel money and 
goods (or drugs and other contraband) through legitimate businesses or shell companies, 
and they can purchase and sell real estate.104 In a thriving economy, such endeavors can 
and do finance terrorists.   
Of concern in both Peru and Colombia is the percentage of the populations at or 
below the poverty line. Although there is no correlation or causation between poverty and 
those engaging in terrorism, if the poor in these two countries are marginalized without a 
means to surpass their social status, they may opt to engage in activities with any of the 
criminal or terrorist entities within their countries.105 It is necessary to heed Saighal’s 
warning, “the inequitable distribution of global wealth will continue to be reckoned as 
one of the causes that leads to greater global unrest, a condition that makes it easier for 
the recruitment of unemployed and frustrated people for taking up arms against the 
established order.”106 These frustrated potential recruits may not necessarily engage in 
the terrorist activities of the FARC, ELN, AUC or SL, but they may find it profitable to 
be intermediaries for the terrorists’ money laundering activities. Poor disenchanted 
people can establish bank accounts through which small amounts of unlawful money can 
enter virtually undetected through international remittance. They can lend themselves to 
be the legitimate figureheads of fictitious enterprises or even legitimate businesses whose 
licit purpose is to launder money. They may lend themselves to be the “mules” that 
transport the unlawful money for currency conversion. Or if not, by transporting illicit 
funds, they may transport illegal narcotics.107 
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The Colombian and Peruvian markets are small and emerging while the London 
market is much more developed. In Peru and Colombia, private investment and savings is 
not widespread potentially rendering detection of illicit monetary activities a much 
simpler task than in Great Britain. Detection would be particularly noticeable if there 
were an increase or established pattern in the amounts placed in the banks as well as 
withdrawn. However, the technology necessary to integrate all financial institution 
information is extremely costly.  
In all three cases, the stability of the banking and financial systems render 
investing and engaging in business transactions a profitable endeavor. However, a 
possible deterrent in the Colombian banking sector is the taxation of withdrawals from 
checking and savings accounts. In Colombia, this may push money launderers to engage 
in either low-income housing purchases or sales and purchases of foreign currency, 
which are not subject to tax. The purchase of foreign currency is a very likely tactic, 
especially for the FARC and ELN, to launder drug money smuggled into the country. The 
illicit cash can be dispersed amongst several, presumably reputable, individuals or 
corporations so that they may legitimately purchase the foreign currency and effectively 
launder the money. Another alternative terrorist organizations may engage in to raise 
their finances is the purchase of stocks going through an intermediary broker or 
corporation to ensure the activity appears legitimate. By using intermediaries or 
legitimate businesses, the financial markets are wide open for terrorists to hedge funds 
and potentially increase their capital in a prospering economy. 
The highest level of risk in Colombia for illicit financing activities lies within the 
financial institutions. This is due to the lack of verification of transactions between 
financial institutions. The key necessity is entry into a financial network through bribery, 
extortion, or coercion of employees in key positions and access, which may be a simple 
task for criminal elements or terrorists. Once inside the institution, transfers and 
transactions from one bank to another are not scrutinized due to the mutual assumptions 
and expectations that all institutions are abiding by the law and the “Know Your Client” 
requirements. Once in the financial institution, terrorists can deposit money from illicit 
activities and move the funds around the world. The use of automatic teller cards 
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facilitates the location from or to which funds are moved without having to physically 
have the money. Terrorists, through their intermediaries, can purchase cashiers checks to 
make payments without leaving a trace that the original funds were illicit.   
Combating terrorist financing is clearly a global problem with varying degrees of 
threat to stable societies. Colombia, Peru, and Great Britain are but a small representative 
sample of developed countries across the world vulnerable to the exploits of both 
criminal and terrorist entities. The FARC, ELN, and SL can readily use their country’s or 
other country’s established financial markets and banking institutions to raise capital, 
launder money, and engage in transnational financing. These terrorist organizations will 
actively search for countries whose financial internal and external controls are weak and 
exploit them. Maintaining legitimacy and sovereignty is at the forefront of each nation’s 
goals. However, given the interconnectivity and interdependency amongst nations for 
economic growth due globalization, nations must find a way to work together and 
collaborate.  
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is at the forefront 
of the global economy with regards to combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing and presents viable mitigation tactics for nations through the Forty plus Nine 
Special Recommendations. However, FATF lacks any authority to ensure nations adhere 
to and implement the Forty plus Nine Special Recommendations. It is up to each separate 
nation to commit to and take action on the implementation of these recommendations. In 
this study, it is already seen that the vast divergence amongst Colombia and Peru, both 
members of GAFISUD, and between Great Britain, member of the FATF, when it comes 
to combating terrorism and money laundering. See Table 5 for a synopsis of each 
country’s percent compliance compared to the global average. Of note in Great Britain’s 
case is the disparity in implementation compliance amongst these countries.  Although 
Great Britain’s implementation is high, low compliance by other nations allows 
infiltration of weaker financial markets and consequently renders Great Britain 
vulnerable. This phenomenon though is not unique to Great Britain but is symptomatic of 
the varying degree of vulnerability of all world markets and banking institutions through 
globalization and the varying levels of weaknesses in all systems.  
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Table 5.   Comparison of FATF Compliance108 
Country FATF Forty Recommendations 
Compliance 
FATF Nine Special 
Recommendations Compliance 
Colombia 63% 17% 
Peru 65% 50% 
Great Britain 70% 82% 
Global Average 58% 51% 
 
Great Britain pledged to implement FATF recommendations in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and has had more time to implement the recommendations.109 However, the 
divergence in implementation amongst all FATF and GAFISUD member countries may 
indicate where in each nation’s priorities lies combating terrorism and money laundering. 
Presumably, the extent to which all countries are successful and implement the Forty plus 
Nine Special Recommendations will not only ensure each individual country’s security 
but also their neighbors across the globe. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The international community must take a different approach concerning the idea 
that democratization will eliminate terrorism. The three cases presented here illustrated 
that in certain cases, the democratic environment may actually facilitate terrorist activity. 
As scholars have already pointed out, it is not democracy but the elements that provide 
liberty, equality, and rule of law to all people in any form of government that dissuade or 
eliminate organization’s option to resort to terrorism. More importantly noted in this 
study to successfully and legitimately provide liberty, equality, and rule of law for all, 
nations must be willing to look beyond their self-interests and view the needs of the 
international environment and their role in making it better. The international bodies 
established to accomplish this monumental task must be given the necessary instruments  
 
                                                 
108 Data for this table were derived from Jackie Johnson (2008). Third round FATF mutual 
evaluations indicate declining compliance, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 47-66 in the 
ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1440896701) (accessed June 10, 2008). 
109 Jackie Johnson, “Is the global financial system AML/CFT prepared?” Journal of Financial 
Crime, 15(1) (2008): 7-21, in the ABI/INFORM Global database (Document ID: 1440894781) (accessed 
June 10, 2008). 
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that will ensure compliance. Like any system or organization, if there is no buy in from 
the stakeholders, then the system or organization will never get off the ground, much less 
survive to accomplish what it was set up to do.   
Implementation of the FATF Forty plus Nine Special recommendations is 
essential to deny terrorists the opportunity to exploit global financial instruments. 
However, there is no guarantee that each nation will actually implement all the 
recommendations or that it has the capacity to implement them. The disparity in 
implementation of just the three countries under observation in this study can attest to 
this.  
Gathering and sharing information among nations about terrorists and their 
financing activities is clearly an effective tool. The FATF recognized that early and 
embedded this requirement in FATF Special Recommendation number five (see Table 1).  
By continuing to leverage this recourse locally and at the international level, nations may 
have further successes in detecting terrorist financing structures and mechanisms. This 
may also increase the level of collection of further information from those already in 
custody for terrorist activities and their financing. Given the interdependency among 
nations because of globalization, those nations with the technology and control systems 
in place to combat, detect, and deter terrorist financing must seriously consider sharing it 
with and assisting less developed countries in their implementation. 
A rather radical approach not considered in this study or by the FATF is the 
legalization, and subsequent rigorous control and taxation, of certain illicit commodities 
that terrorists and criminals exploit to finance their activities. The impact of which would 
make for a controversial and interesting study. Another follow on study may examine the 
progress of a single nation in implementing the FATF recommendations compared to 
data on how criminal and terrorist organizations, within the same country, adapt and 
evolve their financing activities.   
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